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Incommensurability and Dynamic
Conceptual Structures
Hanne Andersen
University of Copenhagen
Résumé : Un problème important à propos de l’incommensurabilité est d’ex-
pliquer comment des théories qui sont incommensurables peuvent néanmoins
entrer en compétition. Dans cet article, on examine brièvement le compte
rendu kuhnien de la différence entre transitions conceptuelles révolutionnaires
et non révolutionnaires. On argue que l’approche taxonomique kuhnienne et
le principe de non-recouvrement qui le sous-tend ne suffisent pas à distinguer
entre ces deux types de transition. On montre que cette approche s’appuie
principalement sur des analyses de corrélations entre traits, alors qu’il est né-
cessaire de prendre de plus en considération les explications en vigueur de ces
corrélations entre traits. Ceci met l’accent sur les théories, un élément qui n’a
joué qu’un rôle modeste dans le travail que Kuhn a consacré aux lexiques scien-
tifiques des années 1980 au début des années 1990. On argue que sur la base de
ce compte rendu élargi des structures conceptuelles, l’incommensurabilité cor-
respond à des corrélations qui d’un côté portent sur des traits présentant des
recouvrements et de l’autre sont subsumées sous des explications différentes.
Abstract: One important problem concerning incommensurability is to ex-
plain how theories that are incommensurable can nevertheless compete. In
this paper I shall briefly review Kuhn’s account of the difference between rev-
olutionary and non-revolutionary conceptual developments. I shall argue that
his taxonomic approach and the no-overlap principle it entails does not suffice
to distinguish between revolutionary and non-revolutionary developments. I
shall show that his approach builds mainly on analyses of feature correlations,
and that it is necessary to include explanations of these feature correlations
as well. This puts emphasis on theories; an element which has played only
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a humble role in Kuhn’s work on scientific lexicons from the 1980s and early
1990s. I shall argue that on the basis of this extended account of conceptual
structures, incommensurability can be understood as overlapping feature cor-
relations that are covered by different explanations.
1. Incommensurability: the main challenge and the
standard replies
When Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolution claimed that “the
normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not
only incompatible, but often actually incommensurable with that which
has gone before”, he ignited a series of debates about scientific change,
theory choice, and the status of scientific entities. One of the main chal-
lenges of the incommensurability thesis has been to explain how theories
that are incommensurable can nevertheless compete. As Shapere for-
mulated the challenge in one of the first reviews of The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions: “if they disagree as to what the facts are, and
even as to the real problems to be faced and the standards which a suc-
cessful theory must meet — then what are the two paradigms disagreeing
about? And why does one win?” [Shapere 1964, 391].
This is a serious challenge that has shown very difficult to handle.
Even Kuhn have let himself confuse by the issue when at the beginning
of the 1990s he claimed that new subspecialties and the specialty from
which they emerged were also incommensurable ([Kuhn 1992, 19f/120];
the second pages mentionned in the references of Kuhn correspond to
[Kuhn 2000]). Ironically, this hits the core of Shapere’s old, but still
unanswered question: how to make sense of the idea that incommensu-
rable theories are actually competing. Intuitively, one would say that
the fact that there is no or only little communication between differ-
ent subspecialties — like solid state physics and neural nets research —
reflects only that they address ‘something different’, that they are not
‘about the same thing’. But for such theories as the oxygen theory and
phlogiston theory one would indeed say that they are ‘about the same
thing’ and that they therefore compete on offering the better account of
their common domain — even though it has remained an open question
what should be understood by ‘common domain’.
In the discussions about how to understand the common domain
of incommensurable theories, realists have tried to meet the challenge
inherent in Shapere’s question by claiming that later theories are better
descriptions of the same entities that earlier theories referred to, and that
the common domain can be established through this referential stability
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[Putnam 1975a]. On the opposite side, non-realists have argueed that
although object-domains cannot be understood in any theory-neutral
way, incommensurable theories do in some sense share object domain.
None of these attempts to meet the challenge seem to pay due respect
to the incommensurability thesis insights. The realist approach seem
to discard the historical observation inherent in the incommensurability
thesis that, occasionally, scientific terms do change reference. However,
if realists start allowing referential change, they seem to be slowly sliding
away from their unchangeable natural kinds populating the world. On
the other side, when non-realists call for a shared object domain they
seem to be slowly sliding in the direction of fixed world populated by
unchangeable natural kinds. Apparently, both realists and non-realists
seem to be sliding away from their original position towards that of
their opponent, but none of them providing a satisfactory solution to
Shapere’s question.
However, a different approach to the problem of incommensurability
has been taken by [Shapere 1989], [Shapere 2001] and later adopted by
cognitively inclined scholars, such as [Nersessian 1984], [Nersessian 2001].
Shapere has argued that the problem of incommensurability has often
been seen as the problem of how to compare individual concepts from two
theories, in isolation from all other considerations. However, on his view,
the interesting issue is not that of such side-by-side comparisons, but that
of “tracing the reasons for adoption of successive alterations which result
in the appearance of radical, ‘incommensurable’ change” [Shapere 2001,
199]. Such an approach makes it possible both to recognize the depth of
the change and to explain how it has taken place.
This approach has been developed further by Nersessian in her stud-
ies of the micro-processes of conceptual change seen as a problem-solving
process. On her view, conceptual changes — such as the disappearance
or creation of concepts, or the absorption of significant aspects of appar-
ently eliminated concepts into other concepts — are continuous but not
simply cumulative [Nersessian 1984], [Nersessian 2001].
The chain-of-reasoning connections may thus explain continuity and
the possibility of comparison, but this calls for an analysis of possible
differences between revolutionary and non-revolutionary change. In this
paper I shall briefly review Kuhn’s account of the difference between rev-
olutionary and non-revolutionary conceptual developments. I shall argue
that his taxonomic approach and the no-overlap principle it entails does
not suffice to distinguish between revolutionary and non-revolutionary
developments. I shall show that his approach builds mainly on analyses
of feature correlations, and that it is necessary to include explanations
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of these feature correlations as well. This puts emphasis on theories; an
element which has played only a humble role in Kuhn’s work on scientific
lexicons from the 1980s and early 1990s. I shall argue that on the basis
of this extended account of conceptual structures, incommensurability
can be understood as overlapping feature correlations that are covered
by different causal explanations.
2. Kuhn’s account of conceptual hierarchies
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions incommensurability was char-
acterised broadly as a difference in the set of problems and standards for
problem solutions, in ontological commitments, and in meaning. How-
ever, Kuhn later focussed explicitly on concepts and conceptual struc-
tures in defining incommensurability. In his writings from the 1980s,
Kuhn identified revolutionary developments with those that demand a
restructuring of the conceptual structures, in contrast to developments
that imply only additions or refinements to an existing structure. This
distinction was based on the view of a conceptual structure as a mul-
tidimensional network in which concepts are tied together or distanced
from each other by the criteria that can be used to identify referents of
the terms in question. On this view, incommensurability is the result of
developments that change the constitutive linkages between concepts,
whereas conceptual refinements or other developments that preserve
the overall structure do not imply incommensurability [Kuhn 1983aa,
683/52].
In discussing incommensurability, Kuhn’s main focus from the 1980s
and onwards was on taxonomic terms, or kind terms, that is, terms
“which refer to the objects and situations into which a language takes the
world to be divided” [Kuhn 1990b, 4]. The taxonomic conceptual struc-
tures was seen as ‘categorisation modules’ [Kuhn 1990b, 5] in which “cer-
tain sorts of expectation about the world are embedded” [Kuhn 1990b,
8]. On this view, incommensurability denotes the relation that “some
of the things which can be conceived and described using one [lexicon]
can’t even be imagined with the other. They require a different lexicon
which would in turn render unimaginable some of the things permitted
by the first” [Kuhn 1990b, 9].
This barrier to certain kinds of ontological enrichments is deeply
embedded in Kuhn’s theory of concepts. One of the major premises
for this theory is a mutual dependence between concepts and objects
which Kuhn expressed through the rhetorical question “Does it obvi-
ously make better sense to speak of accommodating language to the
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world than of accommodating the world to language. Or is the way of
talking which creates that distinction itself illusory? Is what we refer to
as ‘the world’ perhaps a product of a mutual accommodation between
experience and language?” [Kuhn 1979, 418/207]. However, Kuhn’s on-
tological viewpoint may be difficult to extract from his writings which
suffer from a tension between two different meanings of key terms such
as ‘world’ in passages like “though the world does not change with a
change of paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a different world”
[Kuhn 1970a, 121]. To resolve this tension, [Hoyningen-Huene 1989] has
suggested a reconstruction in which two concepts of ‘the world’ have to
be distinguished: the world-in-itself which is a “hypothetical fixed na-
ture” [Kuhn 1970a, 118], [Hoyningen-Huene 1989, chapter 2.1], and the
phenomenal world which is a “perceived world” [Kuhn 1970a, 128], that
is, “a world already perceptually and conceptually subdivided in a cer-
tain way” [Kuhn 1970a, 129]. The subdivision is not read off from the
world itself, but is a structure which is imposed on the world by means
of the concepts applied to it. On this point Kuhn rejects the realist idea
that ‘the world can be cut at its joints’. Instead, different conceptual
structures may constitute different ontologies.
The conceptual structure is established by relations of similarity and
dissimilarity between perceived objects. In accounting for the constitu-
tion of the phenomenal world through relations of similarity and dissim-
ilarity, Kuhn ascribes a special importance to dissimilarity, that is, the
features which differentiate between instances of contrasting concepts.
It is important to note that in including dissimilarity in the account, his
interest is not in dissimilarity between members of any pair of arbitrary
categories. Instead, what is of interest is the relation of dissimilarity that
holds between members of categories which can be mistaken for one an-
other. Such instances of categories that can be mistaken for one another
must be more similar to one another than to instances of other concepts.
Hence, these categories again form a family resemblance class at the
superordinate level. Or, if seen from the other direction, this superor-
dinate can be exhaustively decomposed into the set of non-overlapping
categories formed by the contrast set. On this analysis, family resem-
blance concepts form hierarchical structures in which a general concept
decomposes into more specific concepts that may again decompose into
yet more specific concepts, and so forth — in other words, taxonomies30.
On this taxonomic view, the decomposition of a superordinate con-
cept into a group of contrasting concepts is determined by sets of fea-
30For a full a detailed analysis of Kuhn’s family resemblance account of concepts,
see e.g. [Andersen 2000].
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tures. Thus, as emphasised by Kuhn, “to each node in a taxonomic tree
is attached a name (. . . ) and a set of features useful for distinguishing
among creatures at the next level down. (. . . ) Attached features are not
shared by named creatures. They function as differentiae for the next
level down” [Kuhn 1990b, 5] (emphasis in the original).
The emphasis on contrast sets and the features that differentiate be-
tween the individual categories in the set may seem as if Kuhn is taking
recourse to definitions per genus et differentiam. However, this is not
the case; the subdivision of a superordinate into a set of contrasting con-
cepts is not defined by particular differentiae specificae, but by patterns
of dissimilarity that may be overlapping and criss-crossing, and which
may differ for different speakers. This is in consonance with a point
which Kuhn has noted throughout his writings on conceptual structures,
namely that there are no restrictions on which characteristics that may
be used to judge objects similar or dissimilar. For Kuhn, there is no
distinction between defining and contingent features. By the same to-
ken, different people may draw on different features when identifying
instances of a category, as long as they successfully ascribe any given
instance to the same category31.
One may also note that this view was developed in an effort to reject
the traditional realist position that the world can be cut at its joints.
In consonance with that, features should not be interpreted in a simple
realist way either. Features may come into existence as the result of our
interaction with the world, for example by the introduction of a new in-
strument that reacts in different ways in different situations ([Andersen
2000, 321]; similar views can be found in [Lakoff 1987] and [Buchwald
1992]).
3. Vindication from cognitive psychology
Similar views of concepts as based on a network of similarities and dis-
similarities have also been developed by cognitive psychologists, most
31It is important to note that Kuhn’s point here is very different from the division
of linguistic labor introduced by [Putnam 1975a]. Putnam argues that “the features
that are generally thought to be present in connection with a general name (. . . )
are all present in the linguistic community considered as a collective body ; but that
collective body divides the ‘labor’ of knowing and employing these various parts of
the ‘meaning’ of ‘gold” ’ [Putnam 1975a, 228]. On that view, for a person to use the
concept ‘gold’, he or she does not need acquire the method of recognizing if something
is or is not gold. On Kuhn’s view, on the contrary, different speakers may draw on
different features in recognizing if something is gold, but it is a prerequisite for being
a member of the relevant language community that gold is recognized correctly as
judged by the rest of the community. I shall return to this issue in section 6 below.
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notably Eleanor Rosch and her collaborators. Beginning in the 1970s
they made a series of studies of how individuals from different cultures
and in different situations group objects into categories [Heider 1972],
[Rosch 1973a], [Rosch 1973b], [Rosch & Mervis 1975], [Rosch et al. 1976].
They found that individuals classify objects not only as members of par-
ticular categories but also as better or worse examples of the category.
This variation in the goodness of example became known as “graded
structures” of concepts. The existence of graded structures showed that
classification was not a matter of sharing a list of defining features, since
on such a view all concepts falling under a concept would do so in virtue
of sharing the same list of features and would therefor have to be equal as
instances of the concept. Based on empirical explorations of the hypoth-
esis that the members of categories which are considered most typical are
those that share the most features with other members, Rosch and her
collaborators concluded that family resemblance offers an alternative to
criterial features in defining categories. By the mid-1980s, the replace-
ment of the classical account of concepts in terms of definition with a
family resemblance account was referred to as “the Roschian revolution”
[Neisser 1987, vii]32.
On Rosch’ view, family resemblance is a matter of overlapping at-
tributes that reflect “the correlational structure of the environment in a
manner which renders them maximally discriminable from each other”
[Rosch & Mervis 1975, 575]. Thus, “combinations of attributes of real
objects do not occur uniformly. Some pairs, triples, or n-tuples are quite
probable, appearing in combination sometimes with one, sometimes an-
other attribute; others are rare; others logically cannot or empirically
do not occur [Rosch et al. 1976, 383]. Further, just like Kuhn empha-
sized the role of dissimilarity and contrast sets, Rosch also stressed that
concepts “do not occur in isolation. Any time one places an item into
one category one is simultaneously not placing it into other contrasting
categories” [Rosch 1987, 157].
Kuhn’s favorite example of concepts based on similarities and dis-
similarities between instances were the categories ‘duck’, ‘goose’ and
‘swan’. This contrast set forms part of a taxonomy in which the cate-
gory ‘bird’ is attached to a set of features that can be used to distinguish
among its subordinate categories ‘waterfowl’ and ‘songbird’. Among
32Although the replacement of the classical account with a family resemblance
account was widely accepted, its detailed structure is still a matter for debate. Thus,
a variety of different accounts have been introduced that generate phenomena like
graded structures in different ways. For detailed accounts of the development, see
e.g. [Lakoff 1987], [Barsalou 1992], [Margolis & Laurence 1999].
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these distinguishing features are, for example webbed/unwebbed feet,
rounded/pointed beak, etc. To the category ‘waterfowl’ is attached a new
set of features that can be used to distinguish among the subordinate cat-
egories ‘duck’, ‘goose’ and ‘swan’. Among these distinguishing features
are, for example, the neck/head-length ratio, the body width/length ra-
tio, color, etc. (figure 1).
Figure 1: Partial taxonomy covering waterfowl. From [Kuhn 1990b]. Re-
produced with permission from the MIT Institute Archives and Special
Collections.
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When distinguishing between ducks, geese and swans some speakers
may use the combination of the two features neck/head-length ratio and
body width/length ratio, while others use the combination of the two
features colour and neck/head-length ratio. Each of these sets of features
are jointly sufficient to identify instances of the contrasting concepts, but
none of the features are individually necessary.
In discussing taxonomic structures constituted through relations of
similarity and dissimilarity between instances, Kuhn never went beyond
simple examples like that of waterfowl. Based on these examples he
claimed that “the same technique, if in a less pure form, is essential to the
more abstract sciences as well” [Kuhn 1974, 313]. For example, bacteria
and vira form part of a taxonomy in which the category infectious agents
is attached to a set of features that can be used to distinguish among its
subordinate categories (figure 2)33:
Figure 2: Partial taxonomy covering infectious agents.
One may note that in the analysis of taxonomies, the various features
are not all equal. Instead, some features are values of others. For ex-
ample, the feature ‘feet’ is an attribute of birds that can take the value
‘webbed’ or ‘unwebbed’. Thus, it is differences in values that distinguish
between contrasting categories, but all are values of the same attribute.
As argued by [Barker, Chen & Andersen 2003] this kind of taxonomy
is easily represented by means of frames. Figure 3 is a partial frame
representation of ‘bird’.
33For detailed analysis of scientific examples, see [Barker’s 2001] analysis of the
Copernical revolution or [Andersen & Nersessian 2000]’s analysis of electrostatics.
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Figure 3: Partial frame of ‘bird’
Further, one may note that although Kuhn stressed that features
function as differentiae, they serve this function because they are shared
by instances of contrasting concept on the next level down. Both Kuhn’s
and Rosch’ views are therefore based on the idea that instances of a
category in a contrast set share a bundle features that at the same time
distinguishes them from instances of other categories.
The frame representation shows how all instances of the concepts in
a contrast set share some features, and how these common features are
related to the features that can be used to differentiate between them.
In the above frame representation of the concept ‘bird’, all exemplars
of ‘bird’ share the attributes ‘feet’, ‘beak’ and ‘body’, but the values of
these attributes vary between the subordinate categories ‘waterfowl’ and
‘songbird’. However, the distinction between attributes and values is not
to be understand as a distinction between features that are different in
kind as such, but as a distinction that shows how features of a given
concept are related to each other with respect to this particular concept
and taxonomy of which it forms part. Thus, while the concept ‘bird’ has
the attribute ‘beak’ whose different values can be used to distinguish
between various subordinates, the concept ‘animal’ has the attribute
‘mouth parts’ which can have different values such as ‘beak’ or ‘lips’.
4. Correlations and anomalies
Obviously, Kuhn’s claim that the similarity and dissimilarity relations
may be based on different features presupposes an empirical correlation
between all features in the bundle attached to a given category. As only
some of those co-occurring features are necessary to use a given concept
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correctly, adding further features will say something not just about how
to pick out instances of the concept, but also something about how an
object already picked out will behave.The conjunction of all features can
therefore be seen as a hypothesis about the behavior of the instances of
the corresponding concept. In this way conceptual structure is linked
to projectibility. For a concept to be projectible, the expectation must
exist that the total set of features that are involved in the relations of
similarity and dissimilarity involve more features than needed to pick out
instances of the concept, and that the classifications which the different
sets of jointly sufficient features give rise to must be co-extensive34.
It is a key premise of Kuhn’s position that the claim whether this
correlation between features holds has an important objective compo-
nent. Although the features may be the result of our interaction with
the world, once they have been posited, they cannot be correlated ar-
bitrarily. The world will show if an alleged correlation does not hold,
since in that case instances that violate the correlation will eventually be
discovered35. Hence, although a conceptual structure has proved to be
a fully consistent division of the object domain for all previously known
objects, a new object may still reveal it as inconsistent.
Claiming that the question whether the bundle of features attached
to a given category is actually correlated has an objective component,
Kuhn introduces a resistance against giving arbitrary structures to the
phenomenal world. If one tries to impose arbitrary structures to the
phenomenal world, situations will appear in which it becomes clear that
objects do not behave or situations do not develop as prescribed by the
current conceptual structure. As Kuhn expresses his view: “nature can-
not be forced into an arbitrary set of conceptual boxes. On the contrary
(. . . ) the history of the developed sciences shows that nature will not
indefinitely be confined in any set which scientists have constructed so
far” [Kuhn 1970b, 263]. Similar views are expressed by cognitive psychol-
ogists who also emphasize that “the environment places constraints on
34Again, the lack of distinction between defining and contingent features is crucial
since that dissolves any clear distinction between the knowledge of which objects
exists and the knowledge of how they behave. See also [Hoyningen-Huene 1989,
chapter 3.7].
35Kuhn ended up ascribing this objective component to the world-in-itself. Ad-
mittedly, he first tried to avoid the use of Kantian things-in-themselves [Kuhn 1979,
418f./207], but later changed his mind: “Underlying all these processes of differenti-
ation and change, there must, of course, be something permanent, fixed, and stable.
But, like Kant’s Ding-an-sich, it is ineffable, undescribable, undiscussible. Located
outside of space and time, this Kantian source of stability is the whole from which
have been fabricated both creatures and their niches” [Kuhn 1990c, 12/104] (italics
added).
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categorisations. Human knowledge cannot provide correlational struc-
ture where there is none.” [Rosch et al. 1976, 430].
This claim that there is some kind of resistance against giving arbi-
trary structures to the phenomenal world does not rule out that features
can be correlated in different ways. Instead, different sets of similar-
ity and dissimilarity relations may assume correlations between different
sets of features which carve different joints in the phenomenal world.
Thus, one may note that the claim is a purely negative claim that not
any arbitrary bundling of features is possible; it is not a positive claim
about the existence of a privileged set of features bundles constituting
the world’s real joints. The claim is therefore far from a traditional
realist position [Andersen 2001].
Since the conceptual structure is constituted by the relations of simi-
larity and dissimilarity and the bundles of features that result from these,
an object which challenges the decomposition of the superordinate into a
contrast set of non-overlapping subordinates will call this structure into
question. This is what Kuhn introduced as the no-overlap principle:
no two kind terms, not two terms with the kind label, may overlap in their
referents unless they are related as species to genus. There are no dogs
that are also cats, no gold rings that are also silver rings, and so on, that’s
what makes dogs, cats, silver, and gold each a kind. Therefore, if the
members of a language community encounter a dog that’s also a cat (or,
more realistically, a creature like the duck-billed platypus), they cannot
just enrich the set of category terms but must instead redesign a part of
the taxonomy [Kuhn 1990b, 4/92].
According to this principle, a conceptual structure is challenged if
an object is discovered that on the basis of different differentiating fea-
tures can be ascribed to different contrasting categories, since it then
reveals that the bundlings of features implied in the contrast set was not
projectible.
However, a set of differentiating features may generate a large field
of potential feature bundles and associated concepts in the form of all
possible combinations of the features. Of these potential feature cor-
relations only some will be found empirically. The question is whether
the discovery of an instance with a previously unseen combination of
features within this conceptual field is therefore ruled out? Or if only
some of the yet unseen combinations are ruled out, while others can be
discovered without calling for changes in the conceptual structure. We
may have discovered that birds living in water have webbed feet and that
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big waterfowl with long necks are white, but does that suggest that it is
as severe to discover the first black swan as it would be to discover a bird
that lives in water but which has unwebbed feet? There seems to be a
need for a distinction between possible but yet undiscovered correlations
and impossible correlations.
5. Explanations
A possible distinction of this sort may be based on the existence of ex-
planations of the correlations. As a reaction to the family resemblance
account of concepts developed by Rosch and her collaborators, critics
have argued that if the categories should divide the world simply on
the basis of features appearing together in bundles, “there are so many
possible correlations that it is not clear how the correct ones get picked
out” [Murphy & Medin 1985/1999, 430]. As a solution to this problem
Murphy and Medin pointed out that people tend to deduce reasons for
feature correlations, claiming that “feature correlations are partly sup-
plied by people’s theories and that the causal mechanism contained in
theories are the means by which correlational structure is represented”
[Murphy & Medin 1985/1999, 431].
This view offers a distinction between theoretically possible and the-
oretically impossible correlations based on whether they can be covered
by the currently accepted explanations. Thus, the discovery of an in-
stance with a previously unseen combination of features that can either
be explained or at least does not violate currently accepted explanations
of feature correlations may lead to the introduction of a new category
as a mere refinement of the conceptual structure. On the contrary, com-
binations of features that violates accepted explanations of feature cor-
relations constitute such anomalies that they call conceptual structure
into question. For example, given a theory involving evolutionary expla-
nations of the correlation between birds having webbed feet and living
in water, the discovery of a bird with unwebbed feet living in water
will be a severe anomaly. In contrast, without explicit explanations of
the correlation of colour and e.g. neck length, the discovery of a black
swan may be surprising, given that all previous examined exemplars have
been white, but the new subcategory may be added to the taxonomy un-
problematically. Or, to take more recent scientific examples, while the
discovery of new bacteria or vira with e.g. variant morphological features
may lead to the unproblematic addition of a new concept subordinate to
‘infectious agent’, the discovery of an agent that can transmit disease,
but which shows features usually associated with proteins rather than
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features associated with nucleic acid is very anomalous indeed. Again,
the difference may be found in the existence of explanations of feature
correlations, such as the central dogma of molecular biology that links
replication with nucleic acid36.
This account may also help explaining why anomalies are not all
equally severe. It is a well-known aspect of family resemblance accounts
of concepts that different instances of a particular concept may vary in
how good an example of the concept they are. Thus, some instances
may be better examples than others by being more similar to each other
or more clearly dissimilar to instances of contrasting concepts. This
variation in the status of instances is called a concept’s graded struc-
ture. These differences in goodness-of-exemplar may affect whether an
anomalous object questions the conceptual structure. Thus, if an ob-
ject is encountered that judged from different features is a good exam-
ple of two contrasting concepts it clearly questions the adequacy of the
conceptual structure. On the other hand, if an object is encountered
that judged from different features is a poor example of two contrasting
concepts it may not call the conceptual structure in question as such.
Instead, it may just suggests that further research may be necessary to
find out whether a new category exists, or if the existing categories may
show some additional features that allows the objects to be unequivo-
cally assigned to one of them. In the former case, the object is a severe
anomaly, in the latter case it is not.
Often the theories that has been elaborated to explain the feature cor-
relations inherent in the conceptual structure will also determine which
features are considered central [Ahn 1998], and by the same token which
instances of the concept are judged as good and poor examples according
to their possession of central features. The severeness of an anomaly —
and thereby the triggering of conceptual change — is therefore closely
linked to the theory explaining feature correlations37.
6. A dynamic perspective
When an anomaly has questioned whether the purported correlations of
features are actually projectible, conceptual structure must be changed.
However, an anomaly only shows that a particular bundling of features
is not projectible, it does not determine how they should be bundled
instead. The requirement in examining alternatives is that in the new
36A detailed study of this case lies outside the scope of this paper; for further
details see e.g. [Keyes 1999a], [Keyes 1999b], [Poulsen & Andersen 2004].
37For a historical illustration of this point, see [Andersen, forthcoming].
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conceptual structure the anomalous object will be ascribed to only one of
the contrasting concepts. Such a change implies changes in the relations
of similarity and dissimilarity and hence changes both of the bundlings of
features and of the causal explanation of the feature correlations, where
the guideline is that projectibility must be re-established by bundling
the features such that the new combinations of features can be seen
as hypotheses with some positive, but no negative cases. Hence, the
conceptual structure will be changed to provide a new division which is
consistent for the new, enlarged group of known objects. On this view,
conceptual structures are clearly dynamic entities which under certain
circumstances may be subjected to change.
This dynamic perspective is essential in analysing conceptual struc-
tures. On this perspective, a conceptual structure is always given in
some form by the preceding generation which passes it on to the next.
This was clearly emphasised by Kuhn, when he pointed out that novices
always
find the world already in place. (. . . ) Creatures born into it must take it
as they find it. They can, of course, interact with it, altering both it and
themselves in the process, and the populated world thus altered is the one
that will be found in place by the generation which follows [Kuhn 1991,
10].
Hence, the important issue is not the synchronous constitution of a con-
ceptual structure, but the process in which it can be transmitted over
time. The analysis of correlations between features and explanations of
the correlations should therefore not be read as an analysis of how a con-
ceptual structure may be established from scratch, invoking the question
of whether correlations or explanations are primary. On a dynamic per-
spective, the question of primacy vanishes since some correlations and
explanations are always given from the historical setting, even if only in
a primitive form. In the historical process they may from there again be
transformed into other correlations and other explanations38.
7. Incommensurability and overlapping phenomenal
worlds
It is possible to imagine several different changes of the bundling of
features which all have some positive, but no negative cases. If these
38For an elaborate version of this argument, see [Andersen 2000], [Andersen 2001].
A simple historical example of such a historical development of a simple conceptual
structure can be found in [Andersen 2002].
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different bundlings overlap, that is, share some but not all features in
the bundle, then they can be seen as incompatible hypotheses, which are
nevertheless all projectible. As the different bundlings carve different
joints in the phenomenal worlds to which they give rise, although they
are all projectible, they are projectible in different phenomenal worlds.
Given Kuhn’s theory of the constitution of phenomenal worlds and
their joints, identical phenomenal worlds are those which are carved into
the same joints, that is, phenomenal worlds which share ontology. For
phenomenal worlds to be carved into the same joints presupposes shared
conceptual structure, and that again presupposes shared relations of
similarity and dissimilarity. However, as argued above, the similarity
and dissimilarity relations constitutive of the conceptual structure need
not be attached by means of the same features by all speakers. Hence,
it is shared structure, not shared features, that yields shared ontology.
The only requirement is that in so far as features are not shared, it is
expected that they are all compatible and covered by the same causal
explanation of the correlations.
Hence, in so far as the features for a given set of contrasting concepts
are not shared, it is expected that they can in principle all be bundled,
that is, that all the different sets of jointly sufficient features used by
different members of the language community are empirically correlated
and included in the same causal explanations of the correlation. Only in
this case will members of the language community who use different fea-
tures to distinguish instances of a set of contrasting concepts categorize
these instances in the same way.
But these phenomenal worlds do not differ in any arbitrary sense.
They are not unrelated. The important point is that the different bun-
dles are incompatible due to the shared features. Because of the under-
lying causal explanations of the bundling, the one bundle cannot simply
be extended by the remaining features of the overlapping bundle. These
are the features ruled out by the causal explanation of the bundling.
That means that the feature bundles give rise to different phenomenal
worlds that are also mutually exclusive. If you adopt one, you simulta-
neously reject the others. Hence, while it is shared structure and not
shared features that yields shared ontology, when structure is no longer
shared, it is shared features that provides the overlap between different
phenomenal world necessary for them to compete in offering the better
account of the world in the form of more successful or more promising
bundlings.
